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Global warming has become the battlecry of environmental forces
throughout the world. Ironically, however, a comprehensive solution to
this controversial issue is rarely advanced by such organizations.
Although individual countries may take specific measures (e.g., reduce
deforestation, ban CFCs, shift to electric cars) to clean the air and slow
global warming, such measures are doomed to failure in the absence of
an effective, long range energy policy.
Nuclear power is, by definition, environmentally clean.1 Anti-nu-
clear organizations have not centered their emotionally charged debate
on the issue of clean energy production. Their concern, rather, has been
focused upon the primary risk of nuclear energy: the potentially devastat-
ing release of radiation. As a result of these realistic and appropriate
1 This Comment seeks exclusively to analyze the impact of liability constraints on commercial
nuclear development. These constraints were intended for front-end nuclear production, and by-
pass the issue of waste disposal. This Comment, therefore, does not address - and is not intended
to address - the relative merits of nuclear power, or issues of waste disposal and alternative energy
sources.
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concerns, the use of nuclear power is governed by a massive structure of
national and international regulations.
Despite the internationalization of nuclear regulation, national regu-
latory distinctions continue. Consequently, there exists a clear dichot-
omy in nuclear development. Industries in several countries, most
notably Japan and France, have vigorously pursued nuclear develop-
ment. In the United States, however, after an initial spurt of production,
industry has all but rejected the nuclear alternative. This Comment will
examine the different nuclear power regulatory schemes of France and
the United States. The United States' exclusive reliance upon liability
constraints has served to virtually eliminate ongoing nuclear production.
French development, however, by avoiding such dependence and utiliz-
ing state research and development capabilities, has proven both consid-
erable and safe.
In America's existing anti-litigation fervor, liability constraints have
been proposed by a variety of sources. From former Vice President
Quayle to specific interest groups, such caps are often presented as a sav-
ior-in and of themselves-to an industry's economic difficulties. Public
perception of America's litigation crisis to the contrary, limitations on
liability do not guarantee successful development and production of risky
new technologies. This extreme example of liability constraints indicates
that such limits do not independently resolve existing development and
production problems.
The history of America's nuclear program is replete with examples
of shining brilliance and dismal failure. After examining America's suc-
cesses and failures, this Comment reviews the highly structured French
development history. The internationalization of nuclear safety is then
addressed, as international efforts continue to play a critical role in future
nuclear production. Finally, a variety of key recommendations for cur-
rent and future activity are analyzed.
I. THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Early in 1942, the United States entered the nuclear era with the
first atomic reaction at the University of Chicago.2 The now famous
"Manhattan Project" ushered in a new world of global competition and
weapons proliferation. After the experiment's successful completion,
however, the military retained exclusive control over nuclear develop-
ment and research until the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.1 Thereafter,
2 JOSEPH P. ToMAIN, NUCLEAR POWER TRANSFORMATION 6-7 (1987).
3 Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
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the United States government remained highly concerned with the
proliferation of atomic power.4 As other countries entered the nuclear
arena, however, U.S. governmental concerns shifted.5 Many leaders be-
lieved that it was critical for the United States to remain the world leader
in commercial and military nuclear research.6
The 1954 Atomic Energy Act marked the symbolic beginning of pri-
vate nuclear development in the United States.7 Under this new legisla-
tion, the government's complete authority over nuclear power was
eliminated.' For the first time, private ownership of nuclear reactors and
nuclear production facilities was explicitly authorized.9 Despite this new
authority, however, private developers were still forced to lease nuclear
fuels from the United States government. 10
Concerned that such new technology would not be immediately em-
braced by industry, the United States government quickly moved to illus-
trate the tremendous potential of atomic energy.'1  The Power
Demonstration Reactor Program (PDRP) was initiated in 1955 to
demonstrate the effectiveness of nuclear power plants to various private
manufacturers. 2 Despite such efforts, American manufacturers re-
mained doubtful.
13
Citing the astronomical liability risk of an atomic accident, compa-
nies in the United States simply refused to develop nuclear power.' 4
Francis K. McCune, General Electric Co.'s general manager of atomic
products told the Committee that all existing and future construction
would be halted "if it appear[ed] that appropriate [indemnity] legislation
[would] not be passed."' 5 In an attempt to ascertain the extent of the
manufacturers' concerns, both Congress and the Atomic Energy Agency
4 J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTAINING THE ATOM: NUCLEAR REGULATION IN A CHANGING
ENVIRONMENT 8 (1992).
5 As one commentator noted:
The 1946 Act attempted to keep secret all information about the development of nuclear power
so that other countries would not be able to build a nuclear bomb. The attempt at secrecy failed
when both the Soviet Union and Great Britain detonated their own nuclear devices.
TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 7.
6 Id.
7 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8 Id
9 Id. at 928.
l0 Id. at 936.
11 WALKER, supra note 4, at 9.
12 Id.
13 TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 8-9.
14 Atomic Insurance, CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 1957, at 587.
15 Id.
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conducted considerable studies. 16 As the hearings came to a close, how-
ever, the magnitude of the problems became quite clear.17 Virtually
every manufacturer (most notably, Westinghouse) testified that private
production would never begin until Congress acted to remove the threat
of unlimited liability. 18 In addition, nearly every insurer testified that the
private insurance industry would provide only a fraction of the insurance
needed to guarantee adequate compensation in the event of a nuclear
incident.19
Congress, in response to industrial concerns, moved to pass the
Price-Anderson Act in 1957.20 Under this legislation, a $560 million lia-
bility ceiling was established for nuclear producers and manufacturers.2
In evaluating legislative alternatives, congressional activity was a unique
mix of meticulous study and political rancor."2 Ironically, however, after
months of painstaking effort, the $560 million level was "an arbitrary
figure" chosen "because it seemed practical at the time and because [the
Committee] didn't think an accident would happen."23 Though a clear
victory for the nuclear industry, several problems remained. 4 First,
American manufacturers were responsible for providing $60 million of
their own insurance.2" Second, the Act was to expire in ten years, at
which time industry was presumed mature enough to provide its own
insurance.26 Price-Anderson's constitutionality was challenged by vari-
ous groups, but the Supreme Court eventually upheld the Act as a rea-
sonable economic regulation. 7
Ten years later, with Price-Anderson set to expire, Congress was
again faced with a manufacturing and insurance lobby demanding ac-
16 GEORGE T. MAZUZAN & J. SAMUEL WALKER, CONTROLLING THE ATOM 97 (1985).
17 Id.
18 Leslie Lass, The Price-Anderson Act: If a "Chernobyl" Occurs in the United States, Will the
Victims be Adequately Compensated?, 7 GLENDALE L. REv. 201, 203 (1987).
19 Gerald Turkel & William S. Lofquist, Privatizing Nuclear Power and the Price-Anderson Act:
Establishing Limits to Liability, 11 STUD. IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 143, 151-52 (1991).
20 Price Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.).
21 Id. at 577.
22 Despite considerable effort and various existing legislative proposals, for example, considera-
tion of Price-Anderson was delayed by democrats for one year (until the Eighty-Fifth Congress) as
simple retaliation against an earlier defeat in the House. Turkel & Lofquist, supra note 19, at 158.
23 Id. at 153 (Statement of JCAE Staff Director James T. Ramey).
24 Although industrial concerns played a critical role in Price-Anderson's passage, underlying
fears of Soviet domination also spurred government's rapid response. US. Congress, Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy, Governmental Indemnity. Hearings Before the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 216 (1956).
25 Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957).
26 Id. at 577.
27 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina EnvtL Study Group, Ina, 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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tion.28 Despite considerable growth, it was argued the nuclear industry
remained in its infancy and was unable to maintain comprehensive liabil-
ity insurance.2 9 Unlike the original 1957 enactment, the reauthorization
involved only a few hearings and limited additional research. 0 In 1966
Congress quietly reauthorized Price-Anderson for another ten years.3"
Nevertheless, the proportion of privately insured funds was raised from
$60 million to $74 million.32
Throughout the next decade, America's nuclear industry underwent
tremendous expansion.3 Reactor orders were at their peak as the United
States sought to harness the tremendous potential of this new technol-
ogy. 34 In addition to orders from U.S. utilities, U.S. manufacturers ex-
ported nuclear technology throughout the world.35 The vice president of
General Electric's Nuclear Energy Division described the orders as ex-
ceeding "even the most optimistic estimates."1
36
The considerable flux in coal and oil prices from 1960-1974 pro-
vided strong financial incentives for investment in the new technology.
37
In addition, nuclear power was viewed by the government, manufactur-
ers and the public as an energy source for the future.38 It was believed,
for example, this clean technology would prove critical in meeting
28 In addition, governmental support for nuclear development was extremely strong. As a re-
stilt, tremendous pressure was placed upon the Atomic Energy Commission "to show that its reactor
programs were producing results." WALKER, supra note 4, at 10.
29 Dan M. Berkovitz, Price-Anderson Act Model Compensation Legislation? - The Sixty-Three
Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 11 (1989).
30 Concerned with the possible implications of state tort law, the legislature concluded in favor
of waiving various tort defenses in the event of an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2014(j) (1982). See also Berkovitz, supra note 29, at 12.
31 Pub. L. No. 89-210, 79 Stat. 855 (1965).
32 Id.
33 As Philip Sporn, past president of the American Electric Power Service Corporation noted,
nuclear development during this time was a "great bandwagon market" in which utilities quickly
adopted the nuclear alternative. WALKER, supra note 4, at 18.
34 Id.
35 American manufacturers, primarily General Electric and Westinghouse, provided equipment
and technology for nuclear production in Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the
Philippines, the Republic of China, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. NUCLEAR
POWER: POLICY AND PROSPECTS 177 (P. M. S. Jones ed.) (1987).
36 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation Fiscal
Year 1970, 91st Cong., 1st Sess, 975-1017 (1969).
37 In addition, private ownership of radioactive materials was finally authorized in 1964. This
allowed enhanced financial planning and reduced long-range development costs. WALKER, supra
note 4, at 33.
38 The president of the Atomic Industrial Forum even described nuclear power as "a developed,
mature industry." W. Kenneth Davis, NUCLEONICS WEEK, Nov. 25, 1965, at 2 (quoted in
WALKER, supra note 4, at 33).
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America's new environmental regulations.3 9 The difficulties associated
with the U.S.'s desire for environmentally sensitive growth seemed finally
to have been resolved.40
In 1975, with opposition to nuclear power growing, Price-Anderson
was again set to expire.41 Once again, a series of hearings and studies
were authorized. Once again, Price-Anderson appeared to be on a fast-
track, as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy actively pursued
immediate reauthorization in order to avoid a "disruption and slow-
down in the long planning process for new nuclear plants."'42 Once
again, dramatic testimony in favor of reauthorization was heard. 3 Once
again, Price-Anderson was reauthorized for ten years.' Under this
reauthorization, however, the government's portion of insured funds was
slowly to be eliminated as utilities were forced to pay a premium for each
new reactor. 45 Despite industry's third apparent victory, the United
States' nuclear industry was on the brink of collapse.
After 1974, the nuclear alternative was virtually abandoned by U.S.
developers. 46 "In the years since the oil crisis one event after another has
discredited the nuclear option and created obstacles to any revival."'47
Nearly fifty percent of U.S. nuclear facilities have been cancelled, re-
39 Specifically, it was believed nuclear production would be important in meeting the goals of the
1967 Air Quality Act, and later the 1970 Clean Air Act. See WALKER, supra note 4, at 33.
40 See generally Id.
41 In addition to increased opposition from various interest groups, the opposition from compet-
ing industry had grown increasingly intense since 1964. See generally, WALKER, supra note 4, at
116-17.
42 Nuclear Insurance Program, CONG. QUARTERLY ALMANAC, 1975, at 277.
43 "It appears that, under the present Price-Anderson provisions, nuclear safety does not seem to
present a financial problem to the electrics. I have never heard it even mentioned as an important
factor in their financial picture." U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Possible Modifi-
cation or Extension of the Price-Anderson Insurance and Indemnity Act. Hearings Before the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 405, 543 (1974) (Statement of Richard Walker,
partner, Arthur Anderson & Co.).
44 Pub. L. No. 94-197, 89 Stat. 1111-15 (1975).
45 This modification was far from acceptable to nuclear opponents. Various coal and environ-
mental interests testified against a liability constraint since insurance markets were realistically valu-
ating nuclear risk. Congress should not usurp a proper market valuation, they argued, where the
possible consequences were of such tremendous significance. As Ralph Nader described, "The liabil-
ity limit in Price-Anderson means that the Government has preempted the insurance industry's risk
assessment function with regard to these damages and has determined that it, rather than the private
insurance industry, will weigh the economic benefits and risk of catastrophic accidents." Possible
Modification or Extension of the Price-Anderson Insurance and Indemnity Act of 1957 in Order for
Proper Planning of Nuclear Power Plants to Continue Without Delay: Hearings on H.R. 8631 Before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 60 (1975) (Statement of Ralph
Nader).
46 Matthew L. Wald, 10 Years After Three Mile Island, N.Y. TIMES, March 23, 1989, at Dl.
47 JAMES M. JASPER, NUCLEAR POLITICS: ENERGY AND THE STATE IN THE UNITED STATES,
SWEDEN, AND FRANCE 187 (1990).
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jected or delayed indefinitely.48 Indeed, the problem has been so severe
that no new reactor orders are anticipated until the mid 1990s.4" As
John Ahearne, a former NRC commissioner recently noted, "I don't see
any new nuclear power plants, at least not in the foreseeable future."50
In addition, over twenty percent of America's current plants "may be
shut down by the year 2000."5 Given such results, it seems quite clear
that "the U.S. nuclear programme has not been a success judged by the
key criteria of operating performance and construction costs and
times....52
Although a wide variety of reasons have been cited for the demise of
America's nuclear industry, several general problems existed. First, the
nuclear electricity demand forecasts upon which development was based
proved overly optimistic.5 3 Second, the tremendous increase in public
opposition stymied industry development plans.54 Finally, shifting pro-
duction costs reduced the attractiveness of such capital-intensive
development. 5
In view of these problems, Price-Anderson's 1988 renewal still was
48 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. COMMERCIAL
NUCLEAR POWER 87 (1988).
49 A Group of Nuclear Utilities Last Week Selected Two Reactors, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FED-
ERAL LANDS, Jan. 18, 1993, at 12.
50 Ben A. Franklin, Participants in NRDC Session Are Not Optimistic About Nuclear's Future,"
INSIDE N.R.C., Dec. 14, 1992, at 3.
51 Id. (quoting Paul Parshley, former House committee staffer and currently a vice president of
Lehman Brothers)
52 S.D. THOMAS, THE REALTIES OF NUCLEAR POWER 108 (1988).
53 See generally, James Cook, Nuclear Follies, FORBES 89 (1985); TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 11;
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR POWER IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 29-30
(1984); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled Plants
and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 500-02 (1984); Marcie Rosenthal, How the Price-
Anderson Act Failed the Nuclear Industry, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 121, 128 (1990); U.S. Northeast
Has More Electricity Than Needed, Reuters Ltd., Feb. 22, 1993.
54 One should be careful not to overestimate the success of opposition forces. As one commenta-
tor has noted,
The influence of public opposition should not however be exaggerated and used as an excuse for
the failings of the nuclear industry. Even in the post TMI [Three Mile Island] environment, a
number of US utilities have demonstrated that nuclear plant [sic] can be built to time and cost
and operated at high capacity factors, so whilst the environment may be difficult it is by no
means impossible."
See THOMAS, supra note 52, at 108-09.
55 See ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN. OFFICE OF COAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC AND ALTER-
NATE FUELS, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER 11 (1988); Cook, supra
note 53, at 89.
"The claim that nuclear was cheaper than coal was demonstrably true prior to TMI. Compared
with a coal-fired unit, nuclear was a cheaper plant to build and operate. This assertion is no longer
the case." TOMAIN, supra note 2, at 11 n.17 (citing OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, Nu-
CLEAR POWER IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 57-71 (1984), and Charles Komanoff, Assessing the
High Costs of New U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (June, 1984) (paper on file with author)).
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not a complete surprise.5 6 After considerable opposition and years of
political wrangling, industry remained victorious as the liability cap was
maintained." Despite a bruising battle, Price-Anderson was
reauthorized for fifteen years.58 The liability cap was dramatically ex-
panded, however, to $7 billion.59 Nevertheless, the final demise of
United States' nuclear development appears imminent."
II. THE FRENCH NUCLEAR PROGRAM
A. Government Sponsorship
Despite the United States' initial superiority in nuclear research and
development, the French government chose a decidedly different route
for nuclear development. Unlike the U.S. system of liability caps and
private production, the French plan was premised on substantial govern-
ment involvement in both development and production.
French nuclear development occurred independent of its European
Community partners.6" Although a Geneva Conference on peaceful uses
of nuclear energy was held in 1955, members were unable to develop a
56 The 1988 reauthorization was a difficult, eight year negotiation between America's best fi-
nanced and organized interest groups. Although incidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl
provided anti-Price-Anderson interests with a strong public posture, industry lobbyists were excep-
tionally successful. After a 1983 Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) report recommended re-
moval of the liability ceiling, for example, the NRC Commissioner noted that "[tihe industry has
come around and talked to each of us about 'backing off' of the current position." Vicky Stamas,
NRC May Revise its Price-Anderson Position, INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Apr. 15,
1985, at 1.
A few months later, three of the five NRC commissioners reversed their previous position and
concluded a liability ceiling was best to "[assure] timely and adequate compensation in the event of
an accident. Mary Louise Wagner, NRC Majority Flip-Flops to Endorse New Price-Anderson Liabil-
ity Limit, NUCLEONICS WEEK, June 7, 1985, at 3. Despite the appearance of a successful industry
lobby, each commissioner indicated "that he had come to his own conclusion after rethinking the
issue." Id.
57 Pub. L. No. 100-408, 102 Stat. 1066-85 (1988).
58 Id. at 1068, 1074.
59 Id.
60 The United States' nuclear industry, though facing a critical juncture, is by no means doomed.
A producer of twenty-two percent of America's energy consumption, immediate elimination of the
nuclear option would undoubtedly cause an immediate and significant effect on social behavior and
lifestyles.
Nevertheless, nuclear advocates should note the evolving situation in Germany. Although one-
third of Germany's energy production is nuclear, current discussions concern the complete elimina-
tion of nuclear power. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has continued his prolific support of nuclear devel-
opment. Nevertheless, Social Democrats, who govern most of Germany's federal states, have
adamantly pursued a moratorium on new development, and elimination of current facilities. See
Nao Nakanishi, Cracks at German Nuclear Plant Renew Energy Debate, THE REUTER EUROPEAN
BUSINESS REPORT, March 4, 1993; First German Energy Talks End Without Nuclear Agreement,
REUTER EUROPEAN BUSINESS REPORT, March 20, 1993.
61 Although secondary French development occurred with considerable international coopera-
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consensus on an effective European strategy.62 In addition, cheap im-
ported oil and coal effectively eliminated any European incentives to de-
velop such a strategy.6 3 Indeed, neither the Treaties of Rome or
Maastricht have established comprehensive energy policies.6" France
was thus free to pursue its own unique system of nuclear development.
France, the first country to patent a nuclear power station, began
development efforts in 1952.65 With the release of a five year energy
plan, the French government called for positive nuclear development and
production. 66 Nevertheless, many years would pass before the govern-
ment's recommendation was adopted.
Similar to the 1955 American Power Demonstration Reactor Pro-
gram, the French government sought construction of several nuclear
plants to demonstrate their effectiveness.67 In response, the Electricite de
France (EDF) quickly established several plants for careful study and
analysis. 68 The demonstration plants proved ineffective in eliciting new
support, much like the U.S. program. Consequently, by 1960 only 0.2
percent of French electricity output was derived through atomic power.69
As oil prices rose dramatically in the early 1970s, the French nu-
clear program was poised for a period of new expansion and growth.70
Sensing this potential, the Pompidou government established a long term
nuclear plan.71 Under the plan, fifty-five 1,000/MWe nuclear reactors
were to be built by 1985.72 By 1985, therefore, it was expected that sev-
enty percent of the electricity and thirty percent of total French energy
production would be a result of nuclear power.73 In addition, two hun-
dred nuclear reactors (of varying sizes) were to be on-line by the year
2000.74
Perhaps the most significant aspect of the Pompidou plan was the
process by which development was to be undertaken. Unlike U.S. pro-
tion, initial production was heavily nationalistic and independent. COLIN SWEET, A STUDY OF
NUCLEAR POWER IN FRANCE 71 (1981).
62 PETER R. MOUNFIELD, WORLD NUCLEAR POWER 97-8 (1991).
63 Id. at 98.
64 The absence of an energy chapter in Maastricht has been a source of difficulty in Europe's
unification process. See generally, German Coal Deal in Peril, POWER EUROPE, Aug. 28, 1992.
65 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 102.
66 Id.
67 Jones, supra note 35, at 190.
68 Id.
69 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 102.
70 SWEET, supra note 61, at 22.
71 Id. at 11.,
72 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 103.
73 SWEET, supra note 61, at 11.
74 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 105.
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duction efforts, a single reactor design was chosen for development."
This decision eased production difficulties, provided uniform safety sys-
tems, and has proven considerably more cost-effective. 76 The plants were
also sited closely together, thereby avoiding the difficulties with local op-
position groups that would later plague U.S. development.77 Localities
were also persuaded to accept nuclear facilities through cuts in their indi-
vidual energy bills and the provision of licensing funds. 8
As with U.S. manufacturers, French developers quickly realized the
tremendous costs of nuclear production.79 In only three years the cost of
French plants escalated from 1,200 million to 2,000 million French
francs8 0 Consequently, the overall cost of nuclear energy nearly
doubled, from 3.83 to 7.0 centimes/kWh, and now exceeded the cost of
coal based production."1 Despite these costs, government commitment
continued and the French development effort was sustained.
As President Giscard d'Estaing came to power in 1976, nuclear ad-
vocates were fearful the new administration would move to eliminate the
Pompidou plan. Such fears appeared excessive when, shortly after com-
ing to power, d'Estaing merely suggested reducing the energy plan's first
phase to around fifty reactors.82 In addition, as d'Estaing came to power,
the previous government changed its justification of the nuclear pro-
gram. 3 No longer the cheapest energy production source, nuclear devel-
opment was now justified on grounds of national energy dependence.8 4
Nuclear advocates were undoubtedly relieved as the new justification was
75 French nuclear experts concluded in favor of fully developing a pressurized water reactor
(PWR) instead of pursuing various designs. After reaching a licensing agreement with Westing-
house, therefore, France pursued an independent policy of nuclear development and construction.
Jones, supra note 35, at 177.
76 Recent Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development research indicates that
France is the only European country currently recognizing a differential cost advantage from nu-
clear, as opposed to coal or gas-generated energy production. Howard LaFranchi, French Lead
Europe in Reactors and Power Generation, THE CHinsriAN SCIENCE MoNrroR, Feb. 24, 1993, at 13.
It has even been suggested that PWR production is cheaper in France, with half the reactors and
have the construction time, than in the United States. SwEET, supra note 61, at 67-68.
Development of a single reactor design was unique to France, as most other countries made
wholesale purchases of U.S. technology and understanding. See Jones supra note 35. Ironically, this
approach was a dedicated effort by the Pompidou government to develop and support the French
nuclear industry. SWEET, supra note 61, at 24.
77 LaFranchi, supra note 76, at 13.
78 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 105.
79 SWEET, supra note 61, at 68.
80 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 103.
81 Id. at 103-4.
82 Id at 102.
83 Jones, supra note 35, at 191.
84 Id.
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apparently adopted by d'Estaing, and orders continued. 5 Once this new
foundation was provided, the original energy plan was generally retained,
and significant production goals remained.86
Highly fluctuating oil prices in the early 1980s placed the French
government in the tenuous position of supporting the extraordinarily ex-
pensive nuclear option. Once again, governmental justification for the
project shifted in an effort to maintain the aggressive development levels.
First, it was argued, nuclear development would help the trade deficit by
substituting imported oil for French produced uranium.87 Second, even
with significant development expenses, the real cost of energy would be
reduced.88 Third, energy supplies would be shifted from the middle east
to more stable regions.89 Finally, the French government sought to ex-
pand internal development for purposes of export once the technologies
were developed.90 Although such analysis had proven successful in the
past, it appeared French nuclear advocates would soon face their first
formidable challenge.
The 1981 election of Francois Mitterand brought the first significant
national opposition to nuclear development.9 Upon taking power, Mit-
terand's response to the nuclear program was immediate. Production at
Plogoff was cancelled, and a freeze was placed on all existing production
and development plans.92 In addition, the President promised a compre-
hensive review of the entire nuclear production effort.9"
Despite this direct response, Mitterand's opposition to nuclear
power slowly slipped as he was forced to deal with the country's com-
plete fiscal and energy situation.94 Soon after the election, orders contin-
ued, albeit at a slightly reduced rate.95 Despite the apparent hard line,
85 Id.
86 The production plan was certainly embraced in the aftermath of a 1978 failure of the French
national electricity supply which left the entire country without power for almost four hours.
MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 191.




91 Despite the tremendous resources allocated to nuclear development, most opposition was lo-
cal in nature, targeting specific development projects. The Mitterand election provided the first
official challenge to nuclear development. Id at 104-05.
92 Plogoff was a highly controversial plant which symbolized the conflict between pro and anti-
nuclear forces. The plant had been targeted by numerous opposition groups and received considera-
ble international attention. Mitterand's action, therefore, was far more significant than merely can-
celling this plant. It was "the largest public setback" of the French nuclear program, and
symbolized the end of pro-nuclear domination within government. Id at 106.
93 Id. at 107.
94 See generally Jones, supra note 35, at 191.
95 Id. at 191.
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therefore, production continued.
Although the original targets were not met, substantial nuclear ca-
pability did exist ten years after the original energy plan was proposed.
By 1984 the French government had installed forty-one reactors.96 In
addition, over twenty reactors were under construction, with several
other orders pending.97 By this time over fifty percent of French energy
was derived from nuclear sources.98 As production continued, however,
this percentage continued to expand.99 Three years later, nearly seventy
percent of French energy was nuclear.1 °" By 1993, nuclear output had
risen to seventy-four percent of French energy production, the highest
level of nuclear reliance in the world.10 1 France continues to pursue "an
ambitious reactor-construction program designed to maintain its leading
role in nuclear-power generation." 102 Though slightly diminished, the
French construction schedule of (roughly) one new reactor per year until
the year 2000 easily outpaces the current American timetable of no
planned developments. 03
B. French Liability Constraints
Ironically, French development also occurred under a system of lia-
bility constraints. Quite similar to the United States' Price-Anderson ap-
proach, the French constraints were based upon a variety of international
treaties and accords.
In early 1960, the European Community met in an effort to insure
the safe and effective development of nuclear power.4 This meeting was
known as the Paris Convention, and delegates were faced with the same
dilemma resolved by U.S. legislatures three years earlier.10 5 Not surpris-
ingly, therefore, the resulting agreement proved remarkably analogous to
96 Id. at 195.
97 Notably, sixteen of the reactors were of a 1,300 WMe design. Although reactor orders were
below the number anticipated under the original energy plan, this significance was somewhat offset
by the newer, high output facilities. Id at 195.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 107.
101 LaFranchi, supra note 76, at 13.
102 Id. Continued French development is unique, given the virtual moratorium on nuclear devel-
opment throughout Europe. As Alain Breton, director of economic prospects and strategy for Ele-
tricite de France (EDF), describes, "[r]ight now France's nuclear-power policy leaves it isolated."
Id.
103 Id.
104 NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY/ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, THIRD PARTY LIABILITY 12 (1990).
105 Id.; See generally supra note 4.
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Price-Anderson's contentions. 6 As the Convention's Preamble stated,
its goal was to ensure continued nuclear development, while providing
equitable compensation for those injured by nuclear incidents. 7
Given the tremendous challenge of accomplishing such conflicting
goals, the European delegates concluded in favor of limiting liability. 1 8
As with the American experience in 1957, pro-nuclear sentiment in 1960
Europe produced sweeping success for development forces, particularly
in France.' °9 Nevertheless, the issue of uncompensated injury remained
at issue, and European delegates were soon forced to resolve the publicly
distasteful threat.
Because U.S. legislatures could not resolve the issue of uncompen-
sated injury, Price-Anderson's liability cap was an arbitrary level chosen
with the recognition that the federal legislature could quickly respond to
an extraordinary nuclear incident. 110 Unfortunately, such a rapid legisla-
tive response was not available in the highly fractured European system.
Consequently, in 1963, most of the Paris Convention signatories adopted
the Brussels Supplementary Convention preemptively guaranteeing addi-
tional compensation should compensation under the Paris Convention
prove inadequate."' Nevertheless, government support beyond an oper-
106 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris Convention),
opened for signature 29 July, 1960, modified by an Additional Protocol signed 28 January, 1964, in
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS ON CIvn. LIABLIrTY
FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE 21 (1976).
107 Id. at 21.
108 Ratification or accession to the Paris Convention and Brussels Supplementary Convention,
though not especially rapid, has generally been adopted across Europe. The following countries
have adopted (through ratification or accession) basic tenants of the Paris Convention (PC), Brussels
Supplementary Convention (BSC), 1964 Protocol (1964P) and 1982 Protocol (1982P).
PC BSC & 1964P 1982P
Austria - - -
Belgium 1966 1985 1985
Denmark 1974 1974 1989
Finland (acc.) 1972 1977 1990
France 1966 1966 1990
Germany, F.R. 1975 1975 1985
Greece 1970 - -
Italy 1975 1976 1985
Norway 1973 1973 1986
Netherlands 1979 1979 -
Portugal 1977 - -
Spain 1961 1966 1988
Sweden 1968 1968 1983
Turkey 1961 --
U.K. 1966 1966 1985
Although each country retains the authority to modify these international agreements, basic
provisions of the Conventions must be met. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY, supra note 104, at 14-15.
109 See supra notes 17-21.
110 See generally Turkel & Lofquist, supra note 19, at 153.
111 THIRD PARTY LIABILITY, supra note 104, at 14; See supra note 108.
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ator's financial obligation was a fairly limited $125 million.1 1 2 Both Con-
ventions were amended by Protocols in 1964 and 1982, in an effort to
increase the amount of compensation and update their structure and
legal effect.
113
France has adopted and modified both the Paris Convention and the
Brussels Supplementary Convention, as well as a variety of additional
international agreements covering additional nuclear liability matters.114
Since adoption of these international agreements, third party liability,
while varying from United States levels, has been significantly curtailed
in France."1 5 Although specifying particular levels of liability, both Con-
ventions allow flexible adoption by signatories.1 16 Under the current
French standard, maximum liability for a nuclear incident is 60 million
French francs. 17 This level varies depending on the type of incident and
individuals involved.11 Nevertheless, the general figure demonstrates
that French producers operated within an economic environment similar
to U.S. corporations. The only remaining distinction, therefore, is the
level of governmental commitment to safe and effective development
efforts.
Although some argue that France over-developed its nuclear capa-
112 NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND INSURANCE: STATUS AND PROSPECTS (Proceedings
of the Munich Symposium, Sept. 10-14, 1984), at 143.
113 One notable enhancement was replacing the European Monetary Agreement (EMF) unit with
the Special Drawing Right (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund with regard to liability com-
pensation levels. Id. at 142. In addition, the 1982 Protocol would increase Brussels Supplementary
Convention financial protection to a maximum of 300 million SDRs (approximately 300 million U.S.
dollars). See Id. at 143.
The 1982 Protocol is not yet in force. It is dependent upon the complete ratification of all
parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention. Id.; See supra note 108.
114 See supra note 108. Additional agreements include, for example, legislation concerning mari-
time transport of nuclear material. France has ratified the December 17, 1971 Brussels Convention
on Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material. THIRD PARTY LIABILrrY,
supra note 104, at 97.
115 Act. No. 90-488 of June 16, 1990 (published in JOURNAL OFnCIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANCAISE, June 17, 1990).
116 See generally NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND INSURANCE supra note 112, at 142-
43. The Paris Convention established a maximum liability of fifteen million International Monetary
Fund Special Drawing Rights (approximately fifteen million U.S. dollars). Signatories may, taking
into account the availability of financial security, fix a higher or lower amount, to a lower limit of
five million SDRs, by national legislation. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY, supra note 104, at 12-13.
117 Under the Paris Convention and its progeny, this specific amount must be viewed as an Inter-
national Monetary Fund Special Drawing Right (SDR). Accordingly, the 600 million FF limit is
worth approximately 80 million SDRs, or $80 million U.S. dollars. See THIRD PARTY LIABILITY,
supra note 104, at 12, 100.
118 Maximum liability for incidents involving the transport of nuclear materials, for example, is
limited to 150 million French francs. Act, supra note 115, at § 9.
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bility, the distinction with U.S. production remains clear.' 19 While coal
and oil development dominate U.S. energy production efforts, the French
nuclear program has proven so successful it exports energy throughout
Europe. 2 ' Reduced U.S. development would still easily be justified if it
were the result of improved safety standards and requirements in the
United States. 12 1 Unfortunately, this is simply not the case.' 22
III. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
Once it became clear that the United States would not remain the
only atomic state, U.S. legislators quickly worked to establish interna-
tional agreements with respect to nuclear power. Although most such
efforts were dedicated to containing nuclear proliferation, many of the
international accords also contained detailed specifications with respect
to nuclear safety. As a result, most safety issues associated with nuclear
development have been baselined through international cooperation.
123
Due in part to such international agreements, the extraordinary growth
of French nuclear production did not result in a significant safety
decrease.
119 "We [France) could eventually cut down to 20 reactors and still maintain our standard of
living." LaFranchi, supra note 76, at 13 (quoting Raymond Sene, a nuclear physicist).
120 Henry R. Linden, Energy, Economy, and the Environment, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY,
May 15, 1992, at 31.
121 In reviewing the constitutionality of Price-Anderson, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that
reduced liability would lead to decreased safety. Duke Power, supra note 27, at 87.
122 A variety of articles and texts have criticized Price-Anderson for removing the nuclear indus-
try from normal market pressures, thereby reducing industrial safety considerations. See Marcie
Rosenthal, Note, How the Price-Anderson Act Failed the Nuclear Industry, 15 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L.
121 (1990); Joseph P. Tomain, Law and Policy in the Activist State: Rethinking Nuclear Regulation,
38 RUTGERS L. REv. 187 (1986); Green, Nuclear Power: Risk Liability and Indemnity, 71 MICH. L.
REv. 479 (1973). The U.S. Supreme Court has soundly rejected such analysis. See supra note 121.
In any event, since French and U.S. developers both operated under liability constraints such
analysis is moot, and safety distinctions must be attributed to other factors. In addition, it is highly
doubtful that the elimination of nuclear liability constraints would have a statistically significant
effect on industrial safety policy. As one economist described:
The regulated firm with limited liability will accept higher probabilities of an accident and also
will locate to raise the damage from accident. Simple comparative statistics show that safety
drops when liability does, but a sensitivity analysis indicates that the gains to increasing liability
may already be nearly exhausted if firms are acting as though they face losses of $1.5 billion or
more.. .Thus, if we can be confident that the government has exploited more cost-effective
safety measures already and is constantly moving toward more expensive safety measures, we
can expect the level of safety to be higher already than changes in liability could achieve.
WILLIAM C. WOOD, INSURING NUCLEAR POWER: LIABILITY, SAFETY, AND ECONOMIC EFFI-
CIENCY 42 (1982).
123 Most countries maintain a considerable independent nuclear regulatory structure. This is par-
ticularly significant since many agreements are not binding upon member countries. Nevertheless,
maintenance of uniform international guidelines guarantees a certain consistency in nuclear develop-
ment between countries such as the United States or France, which are members of most such
treaties.
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As World War II came to a close, there were strong indications that
a variety of countries were actively developing atomic technologies.124 In
an attempt to forestall and contain such efforts, western countries, partic-
ularly the United States, sought to regulate nuclear development.' 25
The 1945 Baruch Plan was one of the first attempts to foster interna-
tional cooperation. 126 Despite early success, it eventually proved ineffec-
tive as the Soviet Union refused to cooperate with its organizational
requirements. 127 As attempts to find agreement and cooperation failed,
the United States moved toward a hard-line approach. The Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1954, for example, prohibited the dissemination of informa-
tion about U.S. nuclear research.' 2  As countries independently
established atomic capabilities, without the guidance and supervision of
the international community, this approach had clearly failed.
129
The most successful attempt at international regulation began in
1956 with the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).l a° Created by the United Nations, more than one hundred sig-
natories currently endorse IAEA requirements.' Although the IAEA
works to advance a variety of goals, the establishment of uniform safety
guidelines remains the driving force.' 32  Indeed, Article III of the
agency's directive specifically states that it shall work to protect the
safety and health of member countries.' To accomplish this difficult
task, the IAEA maintains on-site testing programs to ensure compliance
with IAEA initiatives.'3 4 Inspection efforts are limited, however, to situ-
ations in which concerned parties make specific enforcement requests.'35
As a result, the IAEA has recently come under heavy criticism.' 3 6 Such
124 See supra note 5.
125 See Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
126 U.S. State Department Publication 2498, Report on the International Control of Atomic En-
ergy, Mar. 1946.
127 Peter Riley, The Legal Control of Nuclear Energy Between States, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303,
307 (1990/1991).
128 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
129 See TOMAIN, supra note 2.
130 Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1094, T.I.A.S.
3873 (hereinafter IAEA Treaty).
131 Riley, supra note 127, at 309.
132 ICL
133 HA VINH PHUONG, IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS, THEIR LEGAL STATUS AND IMPLEMENTA-
TION 3-7 (1985), cited by Riley, supra note 127, at 309.
134 See IAEA Treaty, supra note 130, at Art. XII(A)(6).
135 Ird
136 "The IAEA has proved itself a worthless organization.. .They proved that in Iraq. They are
proving it again in their inspections of Iran. They are a toothless watchdog." Jonathan Kaufman,
Buying the Bomb, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 21, 1992, at 1 (quoting Kenneth Timmerman).
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criticisms are generally directed to IAEA's enforcement capability."3 7
They are not related to IAEA's technical mandates. Consequently, for
countries such as France and the United States, which have adopted
IAEA directives, the IAEA has been successful in fulfilling its directive
of safety and protection.
Shortly after the IAEA was introduced, the European Community
initiated additional efforts toward uniform development. The Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) was estab-
lished in 1961.38 Since that time, the OECD has worked to promote
sustained international economic growth, the expansion of world trade,
and establish consistent safety specifications for nuclear development
throughout member countries. 13 9 Although the original signatories in-
cluded nineteen European states and the United States, several non-Eu-
ropean governments have joined since that time. 40
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), OECD's nuclear development
branch, was created in 1972.1 Dedicated to the promotion of coopera-
tion in the safety and regulatory aspects of nuclear development, the
NEA constantly assesses the economic value of nuclear energy for each
member country. 42 In addition, the NEA has pursued the uniformity of
nuclear development and safety regulations.4 3
Finally, OECD's efforts have been supplemented by the European
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). EURATOM was created by
the European Atomic Energy Community Treaty of 1959.1' Unlike
other nuclear treaties and agreements, EURATOM's central mission was
clear and immediate: develop exchanges between countries to sponsor the
speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries.'45 Despite this
developmental goal, however, Article 2 of EURATOM's charter con-
cludes that the Community must establish and ensure the application of
uniform safety standards for the protection of health.'46
137 As a Cold War instrument, the IAEA's organizational structure is ill prepared to deal with
the current proliferation of trade in nuclear materials. Id at 1. For example, under the current
IAEA mandate, the Agency is unable to inspect Russian nuclear materials. Id
138 Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, December 14,
1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. 4891 (hereinafter OECD Treaty).
139 Id. at Art. I.
140 Riley, supra note 127, at 309 (citing Twelfth Report of the OECD-NEA (1983)).
141 Id. at 308.
142 IJd
143 Id (citing OECD-NEA, DESCRIPTION OF LICENSING SYSTEMS AND INSPECTIONS OF N'u-
CLEAR INSTALLATIONS 149-55 (1980)).
144 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), January 1,
1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 169.
145 Id at 172.
146 Ird
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IV. ANALYSIS
Despite the highly charged, emotional nature of the nuclear debate,
most supporters and opponents would agree with a single tenet: the his-
tory of U.S. nuclear development is riddled with administrative mistakes
and technological optimism. Without question, both U.S. policy makers
and the nuclear industry made a variety of critical decisions which dras-
tically impaired the country's program of nuclear development.
There is little doubt that America's nuclear production effort has
failed.14 7 Although no new reactors have been completed since the
1970s, new development appears years away.148 Additionally, plant de-
lays and cancellations have cost taxpayers billions of dollars.149 Ironi-
cally, the demise of America's nuclear program comes at a time when
French development, though slowing, continues its recognition of nu-
clear power as a reasonable energy source of the future. 150
Despite the pleas of America's nuclear manufacturers, a cap on nu-
clear liability has failed to insure nuclear development. 151 The central
issue, therefore, is whether a reduction in liability costs, standing alone,
is sufficient to initiate significant production and development efforts. As
demonstrated by the French nuclear experience, liability constraints are
clearly insufficient.
Manufacturers look to a variety of expenses other than liability costs
in making development decisions. Nevertheless, liability expenses are
routinely cited as a key problem for various manufacturers and profes-
sionals.152 This was certainly true in the 1950s, when industry officials
testified that development would not be a problem once Price-Anderson's
liability constraints were implemented. 5 3 Unfortunately, such reliance
147 See supra notes 46-48.
148 See supra notes 49-50.
149 The famous Shoreham plant, for example, was constructed at a cost of $5.3 billion - and
then never used. See Arthur Gottschalk, Junked Nuclear Plant May Burn Gas, THE HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, July 26, 1992, at 13.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has established specific decommissioning procedures and
regulations in an attempt to close facilities in an efficient manner. General Requirements for
Decommissioning Nuclear Facilities, 53 Fed. Reg. 24018-01, July 27, 1988.
For a discussion of plant closures as externalities, see Martin J. Pasqualetti and Geoffrey Roth-
well, Who Pays to Close a Nuke?, PUBLIC UTILIES FORTNIGHTLY, Jan. 15, 1993, at 35.
150 See supra notes 101-3.
151 See supra notes 46-50.
152 Such analysis certainly came to the forefront in the 1992 presidential election. Charging that
Bill Clinton was 'totally in the pocket of the trial lawyers', Vice President Quayle's continuing refer-
endum on tort and civil liability reform garnered broad support. See editorials: Doing Business in
America: a Real Liability, THE WASHINGTON TIMEs, Sept. 24, 1990, at G2; Campaign '92: Bush
More Progressive On Legal Reform, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 31, 1992, at 30A.
153 See supra notes 14-15.
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is clearly misplaced. In the rapid pursuit of liability constraints a variety
of additional factors have been overlooked.
154
Although Price-Anderson did not cause the nuclear demise, U.S.
reliance (historically, and in modem debates over litigation expenses) on
liability caps is unfortunate. As the French nuclear program illustrates,
the development of extraordinarily expensive, risky new technologies
mandates governmental support far beyond simple liability legislation. 155
This need has been repeatedly acknowledged by U.S. leaders where the
technology requires considerable development time and would not be de-
veloped as a purely profitable (e.g., product based) enterprise. For exam-
ple, long term government assistance is provided for a variety of military
development efforts and technologies. In the nuclear arena, the decision
to avoid concentrated governmental support was made in 1956.
In the early 1950s, as Congress deliberated over nuclear power, nu-
clear proliferation, and the need for liability constraints, a variety of pro-
posals were considered. Instead of pursuing such alternatives, however,
Congress concluded in favor of independent industrial efforts. 156 History
has proven the folly of such a decision.157 Congressional adoption of one
such alternative, however, would have produced a drastically different
U.S. nuclear development program.
During original Price-Anderson deliberations in the 1950s, Senator
Albert Gore, Sr. (D-Tenn.) and Representative Chet Holifield (D-Ca.)
proposed a unique alternative to indemnification. As nuclear manufac-
turers lobbied for exclusive control over this new technology, these con-
gressmen sought to restrain such unbridled enthusiasm. Gore and
Holifield called for the government to build and run six nuclear reac-
tors. 158 Unlike the 1955 Power Demonstration Reactor Program, the
Gore-Holifield proposal would have created more than a 'showpiece' re-
actor designed to impress industry. 159 Instead, the Gore-Holifield propo-
sal sought to establish the government sponsored Civilian Atomic Power
154 This Comment is not intended as a referendum on the general merits of civil liability reform.
It addresses only the factual pattern of a highly expensive, unstable technology, and the level of
government support necessary to insure adequate development.
155 While the U.S. government has provided financial and research support for nuclear manufac-
turers, assistance has been disorganized and haphazard, spread between dozens of initiates, agencies
and industries. This is in sharp contrast to the "almost fanatical drive" sometimes present in the
French nuclear program. MOUNFIELD, supra note 62, at 103.
156 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
157 See supra notes 46-50.
158 Rosenthal, supra note 122, at 139.
159 See WALKER, supra note 4, at 9.
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Acceleration Program (CAPAP). 16 The Program was to spend $400
million in the development, construction, and operation of six different
nuclear reactors. 161 The plan was designed to "advance the art of gener-
ation of electrical energy from nuclear energy at the maximum possible
rate." 162 In addition to the Program's exorbitant expense, however, it
was opposed as unnecessary government involvement in a private sector
development process.1 63 Although the bill received Senate approval, it
was opposed by the Eisenhower administration and failed in the
House.164 Its rejection was based entirely upon the premise that private
industry would develop nuclear technology once the risk of unlimited
liability was resolved.' 65 Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy
Commission, openly chided opponents as aiding "the attack which is be-
ing directed against the free enterprise development of nuclear power in
this country." 166 Despite such sentiment, as the final obstacle to Price-
Anderson's adoption, the defeat of Gore-Holifield proved the beginning
of the end for U.S. nuclear manufacturers.
Clarity of hindsight is both illustrative and unfair. Nevertheless, in
light of the French nuclear experience, it clearly appears that Congres-
sional approval of Gore-Holifield would have resulted in an extraordi-
nary U.S. nuclear development program, one which would have
permanently established the U.S. as the world leader in nuclear
technology.
First, the six test plants would have produced consistent technolo-
gies for use by manufacturers. 167 As with most start-up technologies,
nuclear development was marred by duplication of effort and highly inef-
ficient initial research activities. Instead of redundant research and de-
160 Turkel & Lofquist, supra note 19, at 158.
161 Id.
162 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), Hearings on Accelerating Civilian Reactor Pro-
gram, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1-71 (1956), cited by WALKER, supra note 4, at 10.
163 See generally Rosenthal, supra note 122, at 139 n.97 (citing H. GREEN & A. ROSENTHAL,
GOVERNMENT OF THE ATOM 256 (1963)); William Lanouette, Dream Machine, THE ATLANTIc
MONTHLY Co., April, 1983, at 37.
164 Despite the bill's tremendous cost, it retained considerable support. Indeed, once it was de-
feated in the House, "Democrats refused to allow consideration of the Price-Anderson bill, thereby
delaying Congressional hearings until the beginning of the Eighty-Fifth Congress." See Turkel &
Lofquist, supra note 19, at 158.
165 The proposal sparked major debate between members of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy (JCAE), who were concerned with maintaining American nuclear leadership, and the
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which argued in favor of continued private development.
WALKER, supra note 4 at 10.
166 Lanouette, supra note 163, at 37.
167 Possible antitrust difficulties associated with such development processes have recently been
rejected. See generally Division Raises No Antitrust Objection to Proposed Venture For Nuclear
Reactors, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION REPORT, Sept. 17, 1992, p. 346.
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velopment efforts, therefore, a central research effort would have
concluded in favor of a single, efficient reactor design to be followed by
private manufacturers. As the French nuclear program graphically illus-
trates, U.S. development consolidation would have produced a highly ef-
ficient and powerful nuclear industry. 168
Second, the development, construction and operation of six distinct
reactors would have produced more accurate cost estimates for future
production. As early nuclear development decisions were made, U.S.
legislators believed national, economic and energy security concerns
mandated U.S. leadership.' 69 The country soon discovered, however,
that technological leadership brought considerable expense. 170 Though
this issue appears relatively insignificant when compared to the emo-
tional debate over safety and waste disposal, exorbitant cost overruns
have repeatedly proven the primary cause of plant cancellations and de-
lays. 171 The cost overrun problems became especially significant as nu-
clear plants became less competitive with coal in the late 1980s. 172
Development of all new technologies elicits a variety of obvious and hid-
den expenses. Creation of these limited facilities would have uncovered
the hidden costs of nuclear development. In turn, the plants would have
provided critical cost-effectiveness and competitiveness data, resulting in
enhanced decision making process with regard to later commercial devel-
opment. As France discovered, with the accurate internalization of pro-
duction costs, development can continue and expand as necessary. 173
Finally, the consolidation of research and design efforts would have
produced a safer system of nuclear design and construction. Instead of
unique, manufacturer-dependent safety designs, a single system would
have been identified and refined. In addition, safety issues involving the
construction and manufacturer of facilities would also have been identi-
fied during the experimental program. Critics of the French program,
however, counter that uniformity has produced an inherently unsafe en-
vironment as every reactor would experience any latent, generic de-
fects. 17  In reality, however, such system-wide difficulties are easily
resolved once the problem is identified. As Alain Breton, director of eco-
nomic prospects and strategy for Electricite de France (EDF), describes,
168 See supra notes 96-103.
169 See supra note 6.
170 See supra note 21.
171 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN., OFFICE OF CoAL, NUCLEAR, ELECTRIC AND ALTERNATE
FUELS, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR POWER 11 (1988).
172 See supra note 55.
173 See supra notes 96-103.
174 LaFranchi, supra note 76, at 13.
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"[w]hen the design is the same, we can undertake quick preventive inter-
vention when we become aware of a problem." '175
The potential success of such a joint venture is dramatically illus-
trated by a more recent creation: the First-Of-a-Kind Engineering Pro-
gram (FOAKE). A five year initiative, FOAKE is a collaboration
between the Department of Energy and the nuclear industry. 17 6 Under
the plan, two nuclear plants have been selected for comprehensive devel-
opment and analysis. 177 The $200 million project will be financed by a
$100 million Department of Energy contribution, and a consortium of
electric utilities.17 Ironically, nearly forty years after the Gore-Holifield
proposal, the goal of FOAKE is remarkably familiar: "to allow potential
buyers to project the time and cost it will take to build a plant before they
make any financial commitments." 17 9 America's industrial and legisla-
tive leaders, undoubtedly influenced by the French success story, have
finally rejected original Atomic Energy Commission analysis and con-
cluded in favor of a consolidated research effort.180 Loosely associated
with the National Energy Policy Act of 1992, FOAKE has received
broad support in its efforts to revitalize America's nuclear industry.181
In the 1950s there was undoubtedly a general belief in U.S. techno-
logical dominance, and a complete indifference toward energy sufficiency
issues. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, that the $400 million
request - for a pilot program industry was willing to establish indepen-
dently - met considerable resistance. Nevertheless, such fiscal concerns
have proven short-sighted. As the United States finally implements con-
solidated research efforts, it is quite clear that rejection of Gore-Holifield
was a fatal error in U.S. nuclear history.
175 Id.
176 David Stellfox, Vendors Told To Stop Whining As FOAKE Process Moves Forward, NUCLEON-
ICS WEEK, Aug. 33, 1992, at 1.
177 Specifically, the Westinghouse AP-600 and the General Electric Advanced Boiling Water Re-
actor have been selected for advanced study. INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Jan. 18,
1993, at 12.
178 Sixteen utilities are currently involved in the program. They are organized as the Advanced
Reactor Corporation (ARC) by the Nuclear Power Oversight Committee (NPOC), the nuclear in-
dustry's governing organization. The Plan: AtAge Two, Some Progress, NUCLEAR NEWS, Jan. 1993,
at 21.
179 INSIDE ENERGY, supra note 177, at 12.
180 See supra note 166.
181 The National Energy Policy Act of 1992 streamlined the licensing process of nuclear plants.
A utility can receive an operating license before construction so long as the facility is built according
to a certified design. FOAKE assists in the creation of such a certified "safe" design.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
As always, it is easy to analyze and criticize past governmental ef-
forts. Recommendations for current legislation and activity, however,
are far more difficult. The U.S. public has repeatedly shown tremendous
apathy regarding the nation's energy policy. Absent any dramatic
changes in world energy activity, therefore, U.S. nuclear development
will remain at a standstill.'" 2 Even if new nuclear development is years
away, several viable options remain available.
First, the United States government should assist efforts toward in-
ter-utility cooperation in nuclear development. Compared to the enor-
mous European state-ran organizations, U.S. utility companies remain
regional and quite small. As a result, they are in no position to finance
billion dollar nuclear projects.183 Cooperative efforts such as the Ad-
vanced Reactor Corp.'s involvement in FOAKE must be continued and
supported.
184
As the U.S. nuclear industry learned, the tremendous expense of
nuclear development requires a cooperative (government and inter-indus-
try) effort. Such endeavors reduce the expense of innovative leadership
and assist industry in developing practical applications from primary re-
search. 185 Cooperative efforts are uniquely important in the nuclear con-
text, given the exorbitant expense of production, and the tremendous
economies of scale available through unified research. 186
Second, as nuclear development returns to the United States, ex-
isting facilities should be expanded before additional sites are established.
The placement of additional reactors within existing facilities should re-
duce siting and regulatory delays. The creation of such 'nuclear parks'
has been effectively used by France in the avoidance of NIMBY (Not In
My Back Yard), NIMTOO (Not in My Term of Office) and BANANA
(Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone) syndromes. 18 7 The
use of nuclear parks is the most efficient manner of surviving the tremen-
dous time and expense associated with plant siting and construction.
Simply put, with respect to public concern and regulatory needs, it is far
easier to expand an existing facility than to develop a new site.
Finally, the United States must adopt a comprehensive, long-term
182 See supra notes 49-51.
183 Even a standardized 1000 M/WE plant design, as developed by FOAKE, could cost over $1
billion. Casey Bukro, At Age 50, Nuclear Power Struggling With a Midlife Crisis, CHICAGO TRIB-
UNE, Nov. 16, 1992, at Cl (quoting A. David Rosin, President of the American Nuclear Society).
184 See success of French nuclear program, supra notes 96-103.
185 Possible antitrust violations of such a policy have already been rejected. See supra note 167.
186 LaFranchi, supra note 76, at 13.
187 Id.
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national energy policy. As parties within and outside of the Department
of Energy and Nuclear Regulatory Commission repeatedly testify, how-
ever, both entities are highly politicized institutions.' In addition, these
organizations are not responsible for, the formulation of an effective U.S.
energy policy. Unfortunately, in the absence of executive or legislative
direction, both organizations have been forced to adopt this new respon-
sibility. The time has come for leadership and direction from the coun-
try's elected officials.
President Clinton's early comments regarding the Department of
Energy appeared quite promising. In addition, Hazel O'Leary, the new
Secretary of Energy, has received wide praise as a utility executive and
former regulator.18 9 An executive vice-president of Northern States
Power Co., Ms. O'Leary has already faced the nuclear impasse - North-
ern States "nearly became the first utility in the country to have to shut a
nuclear power plant for a lack of waste storage."'"g Nevertheless, Ms.
O'Leary is faced with the unenviable task of resurrecting an agency
floundering in the absence of a clear nuclear agenda.191 Given this diffi-
cult condition, a short term resolution to the nation's nuclear develop-
ment dilemma appears doubtful.192 Steps must immediately be taken,
however, to evaluate current U.S. losses, and protect critical technology
for future applications. Accordingly, the following actions should be
taken by Ms. O'Leary early within her administration:
1. FIRMLY DETERMINE THE COUNTRY'S FUTURE ENERGY NEEDS
One of the primary reasons for America's nuclear demise was over-
188 As one commentator has noted, "The [Nuclear Regulatory] Commissioners are frequently
characterized as being too political and arguing from entrenched positions rather than responding
flexibly to the current situation." See THOMAS, supra note 52, at 112.
189 See generally, Michael Parrish, The Search For Clinton's Energy Omens, Los ANGELES
TIMES, Dec. 29, 1992, at Dl.
190 Id.
191 The nuclear industry has voiced cautious support of Ms. O'Leary, citing her March 1992
testimony before the Senate Energy & Natural Resources Committee:
If the waste issue is not resolved, there will be no new investment in nuclear power under
present circumstances.. .It is not reasonable to assume that responsible business people will risk
billions of dollars to invest in new nuclear plants when there is no place to store spent fuel.
Dave Airozo & Elaine Hiruo, O'Leary Appointment Is a Mixed Bag For Commercial Nuclear Indus-
try, INSIDE N.R.C., Dec. 28, 1992, at 1.
192 Such success appears even less likely if, as recent reports suggest, Ms. O'Leary holds little
influence over the nation's energy policy. As THE WALL STREET JOURNAL reported,
Meanwhile, some cabinet secretaries have learned just how limited their authority really is.
Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary had little if any influence over the president's proposed energy
tax, which would be the most important change in energy policy in a decade, and has had no
private meetings with the president since taking office.
Michael K. Frisby, At The White House Titles Offer Few Clues About Real Influence, THE WALL
STREET JOURNAL, Mar. 26, 1993, at Al.
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development based upon incorrect energy demand forecasts. 193 As with
previous development, a variety of different interests have advanced dif-
ferent energy need predictions. Although energy projections may appear
fairly objective in nature, "there is always room for different figures to be
put forward."'1 94 Inevitably, each such prediction is laced with individ-
ual agendas, ideology and bias. As one commentator has noted, which of
us tend to believe the experts who warn that our system of resources is
limited? And which of us optimistically follow those who teach that they
cannot possibly tell yet what resources might lie unknown beneath the
soil or in the sea or even in the air? And the same question about our
own bias may be raised for the bias of the experts themselves. 195
Ms. O'Leary must first work to evaluate such predictions, and estab-
lish firm guidelines for future needs. In the absence of effective planning
and a clear understanding of the nation's energy requirements, the prob-
lem of improper development is sure to be repeated - for any energy
resource advanced by President Clinton.
2. IDENTIFY FOAKE AS A BUDGETARY PRIORITY
As with most other aspects of society, the Department of Energy
will be forced to absorb budget cuts and fiscal constraints. Indeed, in
President Clinton's February 17, 1993 address to Congress he specifically
identified nuclear research and development as a paradigm program
which is "no longer needed" and should be reduced.
196
Given such constraints, Ms. O'Leary should establish the First-Of-
A-Kind-Engineering Program as a top priority. 197 All parties agree that
budget cuts must be made. Nevertheless, if FOAKE were eliminated "it
would be a severe setback."' 98 As the nuclear industry responded, pro-
grams such as FOAKE "must be maintained to conclude these cost-
shared initiatives that will benefit the nation at the turn of the cen-
193 See supra note 53.
194 GEOFFREY GREENHALGH, THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 49 (1988).
195 Id. (quoting M. Douglas, Environments at Risk Culture and Nature, in ECOLOGY, THE SHAP-
ING INQUIRY 132 (J.C.M. Benthal ed., 1972)).
196 Dave Airozo et al., Clinton Singles Out Nuclear R&D as Good Candidate For Budget Ax,
NUCLEONICS WEEK, Feb. 25, 1993, at 1.
197 President Clinton has not yet released his final budget proposal. Nevertheless, his general
budget plan has called for continued funding of nuclear R&D to maintain the current generation of
reactors and the "licensing actions for reactors that have a commercial interest" - an apparent
reference to DOE's ongoing first-of-a-kind engineering (FOAKE) and design certification program.
Id.
198 Robert C. Cowen, Nuclear Power Faces Uncertain Fate, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR,
Feb. 24, 1993, at 12.
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tury."199 A uniquely American version of the development consolidation
which produced the successful French nuclear program, FOAKE should
be maintained for the benefit of America's future energy needs. At $40
million/year (half of which is financed by industry), FOAKE funding
should remain a high priority, even at the expense of other primary re-
search efforts. o
3. INTER-AGENCY CONSOLIDATION
The nuclear industry is currently regulated by nearly one-dozen
agencies, departments and committees in the federal government. Their
redundant efforts have produced an extraordinarily inefficient system of
control and review. In addition to increased costs, this jurisdictional
haze reduces the effectiveness of otherwise well-intentioned safety
regulations.
Ms. O'Leary should immediately identify each such organization,
and work to consolidate their influence. A clear accounting of agency
authority, or lack thereof, should be establishedi Nuclear review should
be limited to the specific authority exercised by a reviewing body. Cur-
rently, high-profile issues such as nuclear safety are repeatedly and need-
lessly debated before entities reviewing any aspect of nuclear production.
Such media grandstanding would be reduced once jurisdictional lines are
clearly established. In addition, more effective control over the review
process would be exercised by the newly empowered agencies.
In the absence of a proper assimilation of data, Ms. O'Leary's office
is doomed to repeat mistakes of the past. Consolidation of nuclear legis-
lative review and national research efforts are a critical first step in the
development of a new, activist Department of Energy.
President Clinton's policy must establish America's energy concerns
and goals with respect to environmental, dependence and financial needs.
Although America's resources appear cheap and unlimited; they remain
finite. In the absence of a national energy policy, the exploitation of such
resources will continue unabated. President Clinton will undoubtedly,
and reasonably, advance research for a variety of energy sources. Never-
theless, nuclear power remains a significant aspect of U.S. - and world
- energy policy, and efforts should be made to streamline its
effectiveness.
199 Airozo, supra note 196, at 1 (quoting Edward Davis, president of the American Nuclear En-
ergy Counsel).
200 See supra note 178.
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CONCLUSION
The impact of these regulatory structures is clear. Although base-
line performance and safety standards have been established by various
international agreements, national regulations play a critical role in nu-
clear development. The United State's development effort, based upon
limited liability, has clearly failed. Although government involvement in
private research efforts is per se undesirable, a few crucial exceptions ex-
ist. As the French program has demonstrated, nuclear power can be
used effectively and safely as a primary energy source. This is not to
suggest, however, that mere emulation of the French efforts would pro-
duce a successful U.S. nuclear industry. France's considerable success
certainly merits respect and thorough analysis. Nevertheless, the U.S.
political and industrial complex is unique. First-Of-A-Kind Engineering
maintains this uniquely American approach to research consolidation,
and should be continued by the current Administration.
